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Gaps in financial literacy are arguably responsible for significant errors in decision-making 
by consumers and investors alike. Unlike the conventional neoclassical economic wisdom, 
behavioral economics opens the analytical door to the significance of financial literacy for 
decision-making. This paper presents evidence on the importance of financial literacy as well 
presenting the different analytical approaches to financial literacy that flow from neoclassical 
economics and from the different methodological approaches to behavioral economics. 
Of particular importance is the errors and biases approach, which attributes much of 
financial illiteracy to the cognitive shortcomings of the human brain. Whereas the bounded 
rationality approach focuses on informational gaps (complex and asymmetric information), 
framing effects, institutional design problems, and human capital deficits (inclusive of 
experiential learning), as key to understanding documented gaps in financial literacy. 
The behavioral approaches have significant implications for analyses and public policy. 
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Financial literacy and its implications for the financial 
and economic wellbeing of the individual and society at 
large as well as for public policy has attracted increasing 
attention from governments, think tanks, and scholars 
throughout the world. The lack of financial literacy is now 
well documented and many experts and scholars hold 
financial illiteracy to be responsible for both household and 
macroeconomic financial crises and dilemmas. Surveys 
find that financial literacy is very low amongst individuals 
and households in OECD countries irrespective of income 
and education, but especially amongst groups with lower 
income and less education. Even experience in financial 
markets tends not to improve the level of financial literacy. 
Most people have difficulty answering questions about 
compound interest, inflation, or risk diversification, and 
difficulty understanding budgeting and saving programs 
(Altman, 2012; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Munshaw, 2008; 
OECD, 2005; Yoong, 2010). 
A standard working definition of financial literacy is the 
decision-maker having the capabilities and confidence to 
make responsible financial decisions. Capabilities typically 
refer to knowledge, transformed into skills, required to 
execute responsible financial decisions—the individual 
needs to be literate in financial matters. Confidence 
refers to the capability of making a decision, based on an 
adequate set of financial decision-making skills, even when 
social norms, peer pressure, and financial gurus, would 
suggest another set of decisions. Responsible financial 
decisions appear to refer to decisions that are consistent 
with maintaining or growing the financial integrity of the 
decision-maker’s financial resources. But what is responsible 
is often defined from the perspective of the expert—what 
the expert believes is in the best interest of the decision-
maker. Another definition of responsible relates to regret 
theory, very much part of the behavioural economics 
toolbox—financial decisions that the decision-maker will 
not regret given her or his decision-making environment.
Concerns about financial illiteracy are growing given 
the increasing complexity of financial products and the 
increasing importance of financial decisions made by 
households such as those related to saving for retiring, 
buffers against economic shocks, and investment in the 
education of one’s children. Given the gaps in financial 
literacy and their purported negative impact on household 
wellbeing and macroeconomic economic outcomes, 
attention is being focused on financial education and 
improvements to the decision-making environment as 
possible key variables that can be modified to fix financial 
illiteracy rated problems. For example, the reality of 
financial illiteracy raises the possibility that improvements 
to education, quality information, and incentives might 
improve financial decision-making. By contributing to 
financial literacy, financial education contributes to more 
informed and effective decisions on financial matters such 
as contributions to pensions, use of credit cards, household 
budgeting, mortgages, and investing on the stock market. 
Improvements to relevant information, with a focus on 
quality (and truthfulness), make possible the effective use 
of financial education. Financial education and quality 
information go hand and hand, forming key ingredients to 
effective financial literacy. 
But the well-documented gaps in financial literacy and 
the related errors in decision-making are inconsistent with 
the simplifying and often simplistic assumptions of much 
of contemporary and conventional economics. But such 
gaps are quite consistent with the empirics and theory 
underlying behavioural economics. And behavioural 
economics can provide explanations and possible solutions 
to economic and financial problems that relate to gaps 
in financial literacy. Conventional economics typically 
models individual-decision-making as if there are no gaps in 
financial literacy and presumes that this assumption will not 
significantly affect the accuracy of modelling predictions. 
The conventional wisdom presumes that decision-makers 
have the physiological and psychological capabilities, 
and are in an informational, governance, and social 
environment, that will allow them to make optimal decisions. 
And, it is further assumes that individuals will make optimal 
decisions. If the typical individual is so endowed, financial 
education can have little impact on improving choices. In 
effect, one might argue that in the conventional approach 
individuals either are assumed to be financially literate or 
that they make choices consistent with financial literacy. 
Moreover, the decision-making process is not important—
what counts is the analytical prediction that individuals 
make decisions consistent with financial literacy.
A starting prior assumption of behavioural economics is 
that there is no good reason to expect individuals to behave 
in a manner prescribed or predicted by conventional 
economics. Too often the modelling assumptions made 
by the conventional wisdom are simplistic as opposed to 
simplifying, generating poor descriptions and analytical 
predictions of human behaviour and decision-making 
outcomes. Also, in behavioural economics, prediction is 
not the only analytical game in town. Causality is also of 
critical importance. And, this can be established if we can 
better understand and model the decision-making process 
and environment. This allows us to effectively move from 
correlation to causal analysis. 
In terms of assumptions, for example, in the real world, 
contrary to conventional wisdom: 
• Humans don’t have the information processing 
capabilities assumed by the conventional wisdom—the 
brain is a scarce resource. 
• Information is not only costly to acquire it is asymmetric. 
• Information can be false or misleading, by itself 
generating errors in decision-making. 
• Outcomes are uncertain so that individuals can’t easily 
and correctly predict the future implications of current 
decisions. 
• Individuals are influenced by how problems are framed, 
even if the frame appears, on the surface, not to change 
the substantive nature of a decision-making problem—
for example, defaults make a difference, as does font 
size, and quality of advertisements.
• In a world of uncertainty and an imperfect decision-
making environment individuals are influenced by the 
decisions and opinions of others, which generates follow-
the-leader behaviour (herding)—yielding possible errors 
in decision-making. 
Herbert Simon (1978, 1987; see also March, 1978; 
Gigerenzer, 2007), one of the founders of behavioural 
economics, makes the case that individuals tend to do 
their best given the physiological, psychological, and 
decision-making constraints that they face. He refers to 
such behaviour as satisficing as opposed to maximizing 
and boundedly rational as opposed to rational behaviour, 
where the latter does not take into consideration the reality 
of human decision-making. Such behaviour can be smart 
or intelligent, but is also consistent with possible errors in 
decision-making and with gaps in financial literacy.
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There are two dominant methodological approaches 
to behavioural economics, which present different 
interpretations of gaps in financial literacy and, therefore, 
for errors in financial decision-making. They also provide 
different possible corrections for errors in financial decision-
making. What I refer to as the Kahneman-Tversky, also 
referred to as the errors and biases approach, following 
upon the research of Daniel Kahneman (2003) and Amos 
Tversky (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1981), maintains that 
individuals all too often make systematic error-prone and 
biased decisions that are largely rooted in the hard-wiring 
of the brain. Basically individuals are, on average, imbued 
with innate cognitive biases such as: 
• Overconfidence: individuals overestimate their decision-
making capabilities. 
• Herding: individuals mimic the behaviour of others as a 
decision-making short cut. 
• Loss aversion: an emotional aversion to losses, as distinct 
to ‘rational’ risk aversion.
• Status quo bias and the endowment effect: Individuals 
show a preference for the status quo even when it does 
not yield higher levels of material welfare. 
• Framing effect: where decisions are affected by how 
choices or prospects are framed. 
• Anchoring: Individuals tend to anchor their choices to 
reference points that are not objectively relevant to the 
decision at hand. 
These cognitive biases are closely related to the 
dominant role that emotions often play in decision-making 
and the use of heuristics or decision-making shortcuts. This, 
as opposed to well thought out calculation driven decision-
making. Errors and biases occur when individuals deviate 
from conventional (neoclassical) decision-making rules. 
Education can have little effect on such behaviour. This 
approach is much more supportive of government policy 
that nudges decision-makers into making decisions that 
some might argue are in their best interest. Experts are 
assumed to know better than individual decision-makers 
what is in their best interest (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; see 
also Camerer et al., 2003; de Meza, Irlenbusch, Reyniers, 
2008; Shefrin, 2002). 
What I refer to as the Simon-March (following upon the 
methodological contribution of Herbert Simon and James 
March) or the bounded rationality approach, argues that 
individuals are physiologically incapable of behaving as 
prescribed and predicted by conventional economic 
wisdom. As a result, they develop heuristics, or experience-
based decision-making shortcuts, to make choices that are 
rational (boundedly rational) even though they are often 
inconsistent with the conventional behavioural norms. So, 
what is often construed as biases by conventional economics 
and the Kahneman-Tversky approach to behavioural 
economics, is more often regarded as rational behaviour 
in the Simon-March approach, given the constraints the 
individual faces. But such rational behaviour can be sub-
optimal. But is can also generate outcomes much superior 
to those based using conventional economics behavioural 
norms (see also Gigerenzer, 2007). 
It is recognized that the typical choice environment is 
characterized by asymmetric information, incomplete 
information, and even false information and poor education. 
Both physiological and environmental constraints can, 
but need not, result in errors in decision making, such as 
relatively poor investment decisions and poor household 
financial management. Because choice environments 
can be changed, this approach provides a much stronger 
rationale for enhancing the quality of financial decision-
making through improvements to financial education 
and the decision-making environment. This would include 
improved access to and improved availability of quality and 
pertinent information, appropriate decision-making rules 
and regulations, changing defaults, changing incentives 
(to mitigate moral hazard, for example) and appropriate 
financial education. Often, relatively optimal decisions 
would be a product of a combination of improvements 
of all of these variables. Simply improving one variable, 
such as financial education, will not do the trick. On the 
whole, individual preferences, which are regarded as multi-
faceted across decision makers, are respected and less 
attention is paid to nudging unless individual choices can 
be shown to cause social harm (see also Altman, 2012a, 
2012b).
Some of the public policy implications of the Simon-
March approach are illustrated in Table One.
Table 1 Behavioural Economics and Public Policy
Public Policy Implications of the Simon-March (Bounded Rationality) Approach  
How to Improve Financial Decision-Making
Education • Financial education provides the means for individuals to make intelligent choices based 
on their preferences, incentives and the information at hand.
Framing • Framing of financial documents and prospects should be designed so that bounded 
rational individuals are apt to understand these documents and prospects.
• Font size should appropriate.
• Location of key terms and information should easily located.
Savings / Retirement 
planning
• Changing defaults for investing in pensions.
• Transparency on the risks and returns of default pension funds.
• Transparency on whether there is a lender of last resort.
Investing in financial 
assets
• Transparency on the risks and returns of default pension funds.
• Transparency on whether there is a lender of last resort
• Reliable product labels for financial products.
Fraud and trust • Moral education to reduce fraud.
• Improved transparency of financial transactions.
• Well-resourced regulators to increase the probability of detecting financial fraud. 
• Severe financial penalties for those convicted of financial fraud so that marginal costs 
clearly outweigh marginal benefits.
Credit cards • Reliable product labels for financial products.
• Easily identifiable and understandable contract clauses.
• Interest rate policy should be easily understood by consumer.
• Credit card policy changes should be easily recognized and understand by customers.
• Defaults for credit limits should be to the advantage of the customers.
• Key credit card terms and conditions should be verbally conveyed to consumers.
 
The varied economic theory approaches to financial 
literacy are illustrated in Figure One. From the conventional 
neoclassical approach, one can map out what can be 
referred to as a financial literacy possibility frontier (AB) that 
yields optimal financial decisions. It’s a product of various 
inputs, inclusive of financial education and decision-making 
heuristics, which are assumed to be at some optimal level 
controlling for quality. It is further assumed that decisions 
are made at this frontier. If not, market forces will assure 
optimal decisions in short order. From the errors and biases 
approach, individuals should ideally make decisions at this 
frontier, but all too often they do not. So many choices are 
plagued by errors and biases, pushing individuals to the 
interior of the frontier, such as at X and Z. Experts can nudge 
individuals to frontier consistent choices. Like with the errors 
and biases approach, in the bounded rationality approach 
to behavioural economics individuals often make choices 
in the interior of the financial literacy frontier, but this is often 
due to gaps in financial educations, incentives, and overall 
decision-making environment. Moreover, this approach 
suggests that, what I would refer to as the ‘true’ financial 
literacy frontier (EF) lies above the conventional one (CD). 
This is because conventional decision-making processes 
are neither consistent nor well-aligned with the decision-
making capabilities of the human brain, yielding inferior 
outcomes. Ceteris paribus, using more sensible decision-
making processes shift the financial literacy frontier outward, 
yielding superior financial decisions. From this perspective 
an outcome at Y would be sub-optimal, yet it would be 
superior to anything deemed possible from the perspective 
of conventional financial literacy frontier. 
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Overall, behavioural economics opens the door to 
the improvement of decision-making through financial 
education and changes to the decision-making 
environment. These can be affected by public policy. The 
Simon-March approach to behavioural economics pays 
particular attention to how smart but non-neoclassical 
decision-makers are influenced by the quality of information 
and the decision-making environment. Formal financial 
education courses and seminars are not as important here 
as are the quantity, quality, and structure of information and 
its availability at low cost, as well as institutional parameters 
that affect financial decision-making. But formal education 
instruments are important to enhancing the capacity of 
individuals to process and understand the information at 
hand. 
It is these factors combined, and not simply formal 
financial education instruments, that have the most 
profound impact on financial literacy. Often financial 
education fails to deliver the goods because it can’t affect 
the other variables critical to decision-making outcomes.
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1. This short paper is based on a detailed analysis of the subject in Altman (2012).
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